

# Crossroads: Analysing the influences on Australian Foreign Policy towards Palestine



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<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>List of Tables and Figures</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
Foreign Policy at the Crossroads	5
Method	6
<b>Relevant History</b>	<b>8</b>
Historical Debates in Australian Foreign Policy	8
Origins of Australia’s support for Israel and Zionism	10
Characteristics of Australian Foreign Policy towards Palestine since 1947	12
<b>Influences in the Domestic Context</b>	<b>16</b>
Media	16
Public Opinion	21
Interest and Lobby Groups	27
<b>Influences in the International Context</b>	<b>31</b>
Relationship with the US and Israel	31
Emerging Global Trends	33
Diffusion of Power	33
Australia in the Asian Century	34
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>36</b>
Recommendations	37
Engage in limited, outcome-oriented Public Diplomacy	37
Strengthen relations with Federal Parliamentarians	38
Continue to use solidarity of Ambassadors from the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Countries	39
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Appendix 1: PwC Economic Modelling from “World in 2050 Report”.</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Appendix 2: Articles surveyed for influence over the Wentworth announcements.</b>	<b>47</b>

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## List of Abbreviations

UN - United Nations

UNGA - United Nations General Assembly

PLO - Palestine Liberation Organisation

BDS - Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions

AIJAC - Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council

ZFA - Zionist Federation of Australia

ECAJ - Executive Council of Australian Jewry

APAN - Australia Palestine Advocacy Network

AFOPA - Australian Friends of Palestine Association

DFAT - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

## List of Tables and Figures

Figure One: Article Reactions to Scott Morrison’s announcement.

Figure Two: Focus of coverage by sample articles.

Figure Three: Political Science Models of Public Opinion.

Figure Four: Data From Lowy Institute’s “Feelings Thermometer” of select states.

Figure Five: Infographic from the Australian Government 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper

Table One: Han & Rane Content Analysis Results.

Table Two: Comparing Australian Public Opinion and Australian Government Positions.

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## Executive Summary

The aim of this report is to identify and evaluate the main influences on Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. The approach of this report is guided by the framework outlined by Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley in their book *Making Australian Foreign Policy*. The framework outlines four levels that foreign policy making occurs at; the strategic, contextual, organisational and operational. As the most tangible and relevant to the Delegation, this report only examines the contextual level. Within the contextual level, there is the international and domestic context in which foreign policy occurs, both being highly influential on foreign policy and thus forming the focus of study in this report. There is a specific focus on the role of the media, public opinion, lobby groups and international relations. As such, the report draws upon a wide variety of sources. Its strength is derived from the ability to synthesise large amounts of unconnected literature and apply it to the specific situation concerning Australia's foreign policy towards Palestine. Thus the findings should be of interest to both academics and practitioners.

The main findings of the report are that within the domestic context interest and lobby groups appear to have the most influence over foreign policy. There is very little explicit evidence to confirm this, however, a wide variety of evidence allows for this to be strongly inferred. Somewhat surprisingly, it is found that both the media and public opinion appear to have little to no obvious influence over foreign policy. This was found by a study of media articles surrounding Scott Morrison's announcement during the Wentworth by-election, where there was an even balance of reporting, thus neither challenging or overly supporting the government position. Public opinion is not aligned with the government policy, tending to be more in favour of the Palestinian side while the government actions and statements favour the Israeli side, suggesting that it is not considered in the policy formation process.

Lastly, it is found that Australia's relationships with Israel and the US are likely to be influential over foreign policy. Once again a lack of explicit evidence hinders this conclusion, but the evidence found ensures that it can be strongly inferred. With the rise of Indo-Pacific states such as China and Indonesia and the US' increasingly isolationist stance, the continued influence of the US and Israel over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine is questionable.

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## Introduction

### Foreign Policy at the Crossroads

Observers of Australian politics predicted that at the 2019 federal election the Labour party led by Bill Shorten would return to power. Early Newspoll estimates predicted Labour to win 82 seats to the Coalition's 63, although Shorten always trailed Scott Morrison as preferred Prime Minister.<sup>1</sup> For many, this would have been a typical and natural oscillation between Labour and the Coalition holding government. However keen observers knew that an elected Labour government had promised a monumental shift in Australia's foreign policy by recognising Palestine as a state.<sup>2</sup>

This is particularly noteworthy for a few reasons. Firstly, the Labour announcement in December at its National Conference follows the Coalition's break from bipartisanship on foreign policy regarding Israel and Palestine during the Wentworth by-election. Australia's Foreign and Defence Policy is often touted and bemoaned as suffering from the deeply entrenched norm of bipartisanship.<sup>3</sup> That for the sake of continuity and the external perception of unity, foreign affairs and defence should not be debated in parliament in the same way that economic policy is. Until recently, Australian foreign policy towards Palestine had been bipartisan, with both the Liberal and Labor parties committed to the two-state solution, and criticising actions which undermine this process. It is meaningful that both parties have abandoned this principle on this topic.

Secondly, the Labour policy is almost in complete contrast to the position adopted by the Coalition. The Labour decision is essentially pro-Palestinian, while the Coalition's stance is largely pro-Israeli, thus Australian foreign policy towards Palestine is at the crossroads. In the last six

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<sup>1</sup> "Newspoll data: state of play seat estimates" *The Australian*, 13 Mar. 2019, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/newspoll>.

<sup>2</sup> Penny Wong, "Israeli/Palestinian Resolution – ALP National Conference – Adelaide", published 18 Dec 2018, <https://www.pennywong.com.au/speeches/israelipalestinian-resolution-alp-national-conference-adelaide/>.

<sup>3</sup> For more see Andrew Carr, "Is Bipartisanship on National Security Beneficial? Australia's Politics of Defence and Security" *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol 63, no 2 (2017), pp. 254-269 and Hugh White, "Defence Policy" in Brian Gilligan and Winsome Roberts *The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2008.

months, there have been several pro-Israeli positions championed by the Coalition government. The first of which was announced by Prime Minister Scott Morrison in October 2018, when Australia was considering to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and voted against the Palestinian Authority chairing the G77 at the UN.<sup>4</sup> In December at the Sydney Institute, the Prime Minister clarified that the embassy would not be moved until a peaceful resolution has been sought and that Australia recognises West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The Prime Minister also used the opportunity to criticise the UNGA and its “anti-semitic agenda”.<sup>5</sup> Lastly the Prime Minister made a statement to the House of Representatives commemorating 70 years of diplomatic relations with Israel, in which he reaffirmed Australia’s and the Coalition’s commitment to the state of Israel and once again criticised what he perceives as the anti-semitic and bullying nature of the UNGA.<sup>6</sup>

The aim of this report is to identify and critically evaluate the underlying factors which have influenced this highly unusual break from bipartisanship and divergence of policy. The report seeks to examine what role, if any, factors in the domestic and international environments have had in influencing Australia’s foreign policy towards Palestine. Understanding the underlying influences on Australia’s foreign policy towards Palestine is important as the position Australia takes has significant implications for the way it is perceived in the world. Furthermore, there are implications for Australia’s relations with partners such as the US, Indonesia and also the broader Islamic world. Thus it is timely and important to review what are the main influences in determining Australia’s foreign policy towards Palestine.

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<sup>4</sup> Scott Morrison, “Press Conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs” Prime Minister of Australia, published 16 Oct. 2018, accessed 12/02/19 via <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-minister-foreign-affairs>.

<sup>5</sup> Scott Morrison, “Address to the Sydney Institute” Prime Minister of Australia, published 15 Dec. 2018 accessed 19/02/19 via <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-sydney-institute>.

<sup>6</sup> Scott Morrison, “Statement to the House of Representatives on the 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations with Israel” Prime Minister of Australia, published 19 Feb. 2019, accessed 19/02/19 via <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/statement-house-representatives-70th-anniversary-diplomatic-relations-israel>



## Method

To address the above aims, this reports adopts the theoretical framework outlined by Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley in their book *Making Australian Foreign Policy*.<sup>7</sup> Gyngell and Wesley assert that foreign policy making occurs across four interrelated levels: strategic, contextual, operational and organisational. Due to the word limit and being the more tangible level, this report will only focus on the contextual level. According to Gyngell and Wesley: “Foreign policy making is profoundly influenced by the context in which each issue occurs, internationally and domestically”.<sup>8</sup> Specifically, Gyngell and Wesley single out the influential role of the media, public opinion, interest and lobby groups as well as international alliances which will be evaluated in this report.<sup>9</sup> As such, this report adopts the approach of a focussed synthesis, reviewing the large amounts of disconnected literature on foreign policy, theories of media, public opinion, lobby groups and alliances and applying it to Australian foreign policy towards Palestine.



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<sup>7</sup> Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 28.

<sup>9</sup> Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 25-38.



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## Relevant History

In order to analyse Australian foreign policy towards Palestine, it is first necessary to understand the past. This chapter analyses the foundations of Australian foreign policy, reasons for Australia's initial support for Israel and Zionism as well as relations between Australia and Palestine since 1947. As the main focus of the report is on the present, this section is intentionally concise, highlighting key points rather than providing a complete historical overview.

### Historical Debates in Australian Foreign Policy

The main debate in Australian foreign and defence policy is between those who believe Australia should bind itself to 'great and powerful friends' for security and stability and those who believe Australia should be self-reliant and confident to shape its region. The two sides of this debate represent methods to mitigate persistent feelings of "weakness, vulnerability and isolation"<sup>10</sup> by Australian policy-makers. Despite links to the Federation of Australia in 1901, the debate persists today under different labels.

Australia's persistent feelings stem from its history as a colonial outpost far away from its coloniser. Historically Australia regards itself as weak due to a small population and even smaller armed forces which have the impossible task of defending a continent with a coastline 36,735 km long.<sup>11</sup> Feelings of weakness contributed to feelings of vulnerability, as the new colony found itself in a populous region in which the people, culture, language and history were completely foreign. Feelings of isolation stemmed from the geographic distance of Australia from the rest of the Western world and wondering how quickly help could arrive if the weak and vulnerable nation was attacked.

The first side of the debate proposes the solution to these problems is for Australia to bind itself tightly to a great and powerful friend, such as the British Empire or the US. Historically this has resulted in Australia fighting alongside the great and powerful friend in every conflict. For example, Australia fought alongside the British in the Boer War, the Chinese Boxer rebellion, WWI,

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<sup>10</sup> Hugh White, "Defence Policy".

<sup>11</sup> Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 9.

and WWII, and alongside the US in Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan and both Gulf Wars.<sup>12</sup> As part of being bound, Australia also follows the lead of the great and powerful friend on most foreign policy matters with little deviation. For example, before 1942 Australia deferred all foreign policy matters to the Imperial Government in London.<sup>13</sup> Even after the dominions of the Commonwealth were granted the power to conduct independent foreign affairs by the statute of Westminster in 1931, the Australian government passed legislation stating that the statute would not take effect until ratified by Australia.<sup>14</sup> While structurally less dependent, Australia frequently adopts similar positions to the US. It is hoped that this unfettered support would be swiftly reciprocated should Australia need it.

The other side of the debate proposes that Australia should find “security in Asia rather than from Asia”.<sup>15</sup> This side of the debate views Australia’s historic “tyranny of distance”<sup>16</sup> problem as the possibilities of proximity. Witnessed around the end of the Vietnam war, Australia’s defence force was restructured to primarily act and defend regionally and secondarily as part of a coalition.<sup>17</sup> Thus removing the need to be so heavily dependent upon a great and powerful friend. This side of the debate advocates that Australia should actively engage in regional multilateral forums and boost trade with neighbours.<sup>18</sup> This is not to say that the US relationship is not important or a fundamental pillar of Australian security planning, however Gareth Evans, the former foreign minister, believes Australian foreign policy was finally liberated from being dependent on foreign capitals for instruction in the post-Vietnam period.<sup>19</sup> This period ended rather abruptly with Australian forces being sent abroad to Middle Eastern conflicts to fight alongside the US.

Generally speaking, the Labor party’s foreign policy tends to agree with the latter side of the debate.<sup>20</sup> This is evident with prominent members such as HV Evatt, Gareth Evans and Paul Keating who participated extensively in the UN and regional institutions such as APEC. On the

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<sup>12</sup> Joseph A. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, (Milton: Jacaranda Press, 1973), p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> Peter G. Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901-1949*, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 1-10.

<sup>14</sup> Allan Gyngell, *Fear of Abandonment: Australia in the world since 1942*, (Carlton: La Trobe University Press, 2017), p. 8.

<sup>15</sup> Nick Bisley and Michael Fullilove “Paul Keating in conversation” *Australian Foreign Affairs*, no.1, Oct. 2017, p. 19.

<sup>16</sup> Geoffrey Blainey, *Tyranny of Distance: How Distance shaped Australia’s history*, (Melbourne: Macmillan publishers, 1966).

<sup>17</sup> Hugh White, “Defence Policy”.

<sup>18</sup> Gareth Evans, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, (Melbourne: Australian Fabian Society, 1989), p. 31-39.

<sup>19</sup> Gareth Evans, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 9.

<sup>20</sup> Allan Gyngell, *Fear of Abandonment*, p. 13.

other hand, Liberal party foreign policy agrees with the former, placing value on power, alliances and bilateral relations. This is evident through the past leaders such as Robert Menzies and John Howard who have referred to the US as a great and “powerful friend”<sup>21</sup> and as Australia being its ‘deputy sheriff’.

With speculation over the declining power and influence of the US parallel to the rapid economic growth of Asian states and the associated increase in power,<sup>22</sup> Australian policy makers once again must debate the merits of binding Australia to a great and powerful friend or engaging in institutions to shape the region. These foundational debates provide a useful macro-level context for analysing Australia’s foreign policy. When evaluating Australia’s foreign policy towards Palestine, it is useful to place it in the broader concepts of this debate.

## Origins of Australia’s support for Israel and Zionism

Australia’s support for Israel was crystallised when it voted in favour of the UNGA Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine. However, Australia’s support for Zionism<sup>23</sup> did not develop overnight; there are several influences which in combination likely primed Australia’s support. It is contended that the main influence which shaped Australia’s position was the stance of the imperial government in London, representing the international context in Gyngell and Wesley’s framework. In the domestic context, Jewish immigration was influential. While difficult to prove outright causation, this section asserts that there is a strong correlation between Australia’s support and the identified influences.

Australia’s support for the creation of a Jewish homeland has likely been influenced by the integration and contribution of Jewish people to Australia since the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788. Although only eight of the initial convicts sent to Australia were Jewish, the population grew moderately numbering approximately 1,200 by the 1840s and were establishing small, yet

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<sup>21</sup> Robert Menzies, “Election speech delivered at Canterbury, Victoria 19th October 1958”, Museum of Australian Democracy: Old Parliament House, accessed 26/03/2019 via <https://electionspeches.moadoph.gov.au/speeches/1958-robert-menzies>.

<sup>22</sup> Hugh White, “Without America: Australia in the New Asia”, *The Quarterly Essay*, issue 68, 2017.

<sup>23</sup> A movement for the establishment and development of Jewish national state. Started in 1897 as a political organisation by Theodor Herzl.

expanding communities in each colony as well as rural and remote areas.<sup>24</sup> A product of their shared Anglo heritage, the Jewish settlers had no issues integrating and contributing to Australia and the British Empire. This is evident through the participation of Jews at social, governmental, and commercial levels of society, and manifested through distinguished figures such as Sir John Monash (commander of Australian forces during WWI), Sir Isaac Isaacs (governor-general), and Roy Rene (prominent comedian).<sup>25</sup> The Anglo-Australian Jews were also politically organised, with evidence that then Prime Minister Stanley Melbourne Bruce expressed “deep regret” at being unable to attend the Zionist Federation of Australia Conference, and that he was “fully appreciative of the greatness of the work” that the organisation does.<sup>26</sup> Thus, Anglo Jewish Australians were a small, but significant part of early Australia, which likely influenced Australia’s support for the creation of a Jewish homeland.

However, Australia’s support was not entirely borne from the positive perception of the Anglo-Australian Jews who had integrated and contributed to society. Rather, as part of Australia’s determination to remain an unquestionable part of Western civilisation, and also minimise the risk of ‘racial contamination’, the government consistently enacted means to restrict the immigration of individuals from non-British backgrounds.<sup>27</sup> While primarily targeted at Asians, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 was one of the first laws passed by the newly formed federal government and subsequent policies restricted the immigration of Eastern European Jews. Even as the atrocities of the Holocaust were revealed, Australia did not change its discriminatory policies, rather there was wide-scale government and public support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, racism and discrimination are also likely influences on Australia’s support for a Jewish homeland.

Lastly, Australia’s relationship with and dependence upon the Imperial Government in London would have been a large source of influence over Australia’s position. Before 1942, Australia’s sovereignty was extremely limited, but as noted earlier, in both London and Canberra it was staunchly agreed that Australia “neither should nor could formulate an independent foreign

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<sup>24</sup> Malcolm J Turnbull, *Safe Haven: Records of the Jewish Experience in Australia*, (Canberra: National Archives of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, 1999), p. 9.

<sup>25</sup> Malcolm J Turnbull, *Safe Haven*, p. 75-94.

<sup>26</sup> *National Archives of Australia*, A981 ZIO1, accessed 09/04/2019, <https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=182961&isAv=N>.

<sup>27</sup> Joseph A. Camilleri, *An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 12.

<sup>28</sup> Malcolm J Turnbull, *Safe Haven*, p. 144.

policy”.<sup>29</sup> Thus, as a proud extension of the British Empire, Australia’s support was automatically given to Zionism with the letter of Lord Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild. In 1917, the letter often referred to as the Balfour declaration, stated that the imperial government “view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People”.<sup>30</sup> Even after the Australian ratification of the Statute of Westminster in 1942, Australia still considered itself too weak, vulnerable and isolated to develop policy that was independent of the empire, and thus stayed firmly aligned with British policy.<sup>31</sup> Thus, it is contended that the Imperial Government policy was a strong influence over Australia’s support for the creation of a Jewish homeland.

### Characteristics of Australian Foreign Policy towards Palestine since 1947

Australian government foreign policy has consistently maintained the importance of Israel’s security, but not every government has given the same emphasis to the rights and aspirations of Palestinians. This is evident from an analysis of the tone and content of key government statements on Israel and Palestine since 1947. Over successive governments, there is a noticeable trend in which the rights and aspirations of Palestinians are increasingly acknowledged parallel to Israel’s rights. However, this is mostly rhetorical and rarely backed up by action.

For the first two decades of Israel’s existence, the Australian government was unquestionably pro-Israel. Not only were government statements lavishing praise and defending Israel, but Australia’s own minister for external affairs<sup>32</sup> was instrumental to its creation. Doctor Herbert Vere Evatt had an active role in the UN Special Committee on Palestine and presided over the UNGA when resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine was approved.<sup>33</sup> Announcing Australia’s early recognition of Israel, Evatt described the decision as “inevitable as it was just”, and when

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<sup>29</sup> Peter G. Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats*, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> Transcript of letter found in Benjamin MacQueen, *An Introduction to Middle East Politics*, (London: Sage Publications, 2013), p. 45.

<sup>31</sup> Bernard Attard, “Diplomacy by default: Empire foreign policy and the high commissioners during the 1920s” in *The High Commissioners: Australia’s Representatives in the United Kingdom 1910-2010*, Carl Bridge, Frank Bongiorno and David Lee eds, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010), p. 56.

<sup>32</sup> Previous title for the Minister for Foreign Affairs

<sup>33</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict: a history of key government statements (1947-2007)*, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2012), p. 1-3.

justifying Australia's vote in favour of admitting Israel to the UN, Prime Minister Chifley described Israel as "a force of special value".<sup>34</sup> While the Chifley government did vote in favour of UNGA resolution 194 (III)<sup>35</sup> on the right of Palestinian refugees to return home or be paid compensation for loss or damage to property, this vote was more likely influenced by the desire to limit potential refugees coming to Australia rather than scolding Israel. Finally, when confronted by the 1956 Suez Crisis, Prime Minister Menzies defended Israel's invasion of Egypt, which was likely influenced by the involvement of the British on the Israeli side. In fact, Robert Casey then Minister of Foreign Affairs described the conflict as "an attempt to smother the State of Israel at birth" and the source of the conflict was "antipathy by the Arabs against the Jews".<sup>36</sup> As such, Australian foreign policy certainly favoured Israel for the first two decades of Israel's existence.

From 1966, Australian foreign policy transitioned to a superficially more balanced position. In the lead up to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War, government statements were concerned with international law, calling for restraint on both sides and offering Australia's "good offices"<sup>37</sup> for mediation of the conflict. This represents a large change in tone from the statements made a decade earlier about the Suez Canal Crisis. Furthermore, the Australian government took a proactive stance to resolve the conflict, with External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck proposing what he believed to be the main issues in resolving the conflict. Hasluck's proposal called for mutual respect for territorial integrity, mutual security assurances, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, access to shipping lanes, the status of Jerusalem and cooperation over Jordanian water.<sup>38</sup> Australian Governments consistently claimed neutrality to the conflict, voting for UNGA resolutions which concerned welfare and human rights but abstaining and rejecting resolutions it deemed biased.

Australian governments began to more consistently acknowledge and include the rights of Palestinians in statements after PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat made an address to the UNGA in

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<sup>34</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict*, p. 4.

<sup>35</sup> UNGA, *General Assembly Resolution 194 (III): Palestine Progress report on the United Nations mediator*, 11 December 1948, viewed 11/04/19, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/65/IMG/NR004365.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>36</sup> Ministerial Statement on International Affairs, *House of Representatives Official Hansard no. 14 Twenty-Two-Second Parliament, Second Session, First Period*, (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia: 1957), p. 410-415.

<sup>37</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine: Media coverage, public opinion and interest groups*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2013), p. 42.

<sup>38</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict*, p. 8.

1974. Some months later, Prime Minister Whitlam made a statement in which he said that Palestine should be a sovereign independent state.<sup>39</sup> Whitlam during his tenure refrained from blaming one particular side of the conflict, drawing much criticism from the succeeding Fraser government which frequently equated the PLO as a terrorist organisation and championed Israel as a social democratic state. Despite the Fraser government's initial 'pro-Israel' positions, the government heavily condemned the annexation of occupied territories, the Knesset claim to all of Jerusalem, the invasion of Lebanon and the massacre of refugees in camps.<sup>40</sup> Thus government statements began to acknowledge Palestinian rights parallel to Israeli rights, as seen in Tony Street's statement to the UN "Israel must recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinians...Equally important is the need for movement from the Arab side".<sup>41</sup> However, these statements are mostly rhetorical.

Since Street's statement, it has become standard practice for all Australian government statements to recognise Israeli and Palestinian rights parallel to each other. This is evident in statements throughout the Hawke and Keating governments. However, as seen since Howard, there is a tendency for the Australian government to emphasise to Israel's security, democratic system and to adopt 'pro-Israel' positions. For example, later in his tenure Prime Minister Howard made rhetorical nods to the Palestinian right to a homeland, yet accused the UN of anti-semitism, supported Israel during the 2006 war and blamed the breakdown of talks at the 2000 Camp David Summit on Yasser Arafat.<sup>42</sup> Interestingly though, Howard was the first Australian Prime Minister to meet Arafat. Although under Rudd and Gillard the Australian government changed its voting pattern on recurring UNGA resolutions and substantially increased aid to Palestine, it largely maintained Howard era policies and did not stray from standard practice statements.<sup>43</sup> Finally, as detailed in the introduction, Scott Morrison has ensured that Palestinian aspirations are acknowledged while greatly emphasising ties with Israel and supporting Israeli positions.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 44.


<sup>40</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict*, p. 19-21.

<sup>41</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict*, p. 22.

<sup>42</sup> John Howard, "Address at Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council and United Israel Appeal, Melbourne", Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, published 22 Nov. 2000, accessed 19/05/2019 via <http://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-11679>.

<sup>43</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict: the Rudd and Gillard Governments (2007-13)*, (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, 2015), p. 2-15.

<sup>44</sup> Scott Morrison, "Statement to the House of Representatives on the 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations with Israel".



Thus, Australian foreign policy has slowly evolved from being openly pro-Israel to recognising Palestinian rights and aspirations parallel to Israel. The statements are mostly superficial, with government action favouring Israel. While this analysis is by no means an exhaustive study of Australia's actions towards Israel and Palestine, it provides a foundational overview of Australian policy from which current influences on foreign policy can be analysed with context.





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## Influences in the Domestic Context

This chapter seeks to evaluate the domestic context of Australian foreign policy making with a specific focus on the role of the media, public opinion and interest groups.

### Media

Within society, the media is often heralded as performing the two important functions of informing the masses and keeping the government honest - a phenomenon referred to by theorists as the 'Fourth Estate' role of the media.<sup>45</sup> However, a competing theory, known as agenda setting, believes the media deserves scrutiny too, based on their choices of what to cover, how to cover it, and what background information is included or omitted.<sup>46</sup> Numerous studies have confirmed the effects of media agenda setting on the general public's prioritisation of issues, and other studies have found that parliamentary agendas are also influenced by the media.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the known ability of the media to influence, this section finds that Australian **media has little to no obvious influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine**. This claim is based upon a study of newspaper articles written before, during and after the announcement that Australia was considering to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.<sup>48</sup> The aim is to determine whether media coverage may have influenced the later clarification that Australia would recognise *West* Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and that Australia would not move its embassy until after final status issues are determined.

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<sup>45</sup> Daniel Chandler and Rod Munday, "Fourth Estate" in *A Dictionary of Media and Communication*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

<sup>46</sup> Daniel Chandler and Rod Munday, "Agenda Setting" in *A Dictionary of Media and Communication*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

<sup>47</sup> Rens Vliegthart and Stefaan Walgrave, "When the media matter for politics: Partisan moderators of the mass media's agenda setting influence on parliament in Belgium", *Party Politics*, vol. 17 no.3 (May 2011), pp. 321-342.

<sup>48</sup> Scott Morrison, "Press Conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs".

<sup>49</sup> The clarification was largely criticised as a “humiliating backdown”<sup>50</sup> and thus it is plausible that through agenda setting, the media influenced this decision.

The sample of articles was drawn using Factiva, looking for articles which were written between the 9th of October 2018 (a week before Scott Morrison announced the plan) and the 19th of April 2019. Using the search query “israel\* AND palestin\* AND embass\*” as it would enable results that included the words “embassy” or “embassies”, 98 articles were found. Of this sample 32 were found to be duplicates and a further 18 deemed irrelevant as the content did not relate to the announcement, thus a sample of 48 articles was analysed. The sample was analysed to determine whether the majority of articles written were in favour of the announcement or against. Articles were determined to be either for or against the announcement based upon either an explicit endorsement, explicit opposition or positively or negatively reporting on the announcement. For example, the article “Embassy Move: a ‘slap in Indonesia’s face”<sup>51</sup> by Fergus Hunter and David Wroe was determined to be against the announcement as the article focussed on the negative impact the announcement had on bilateral relations with Indonesia, it also characterised the move as a “shock” and “overturned decades of foreign policy”. Articles were characterised as balanced if there was no obvious favouring of one side. The articles were also analysed to see if there was an element of the announcement reported more than others. The elements that were flagged were mentions of the US, UN, Indonesia, the two-state solution and the situation in Palestine and Israel, government departments, and lastly notions of the announcement pandering to Wentworth’s Jewish population.

Based on the findings, it has been concluded that the media had little to no influence over Australian foreign policy regarding the announcement. The articles sampled were evenly distributed, with similar amounts of articles being for, against and neutral towards the announcement (see Figure 1). Thus, in terms of agenda setting, the issue was placed high on the public’s agenda with the intense media coverage, however, there was an even balance of how the issue was covered, making it difficult to conclude that the media influenced the December clarification as there was no overwhelming support or opposition. Content analysis of the articles

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
<sup>49</sup> Scott Morrison, “Address to the Sydney Institute”.

<sup>50</sup> “Humiliating backdown!: Labor on PM's west Jerusalem decision” SBS, published 15 Dec. 2018, accessed 12/05/2019 via <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/humiliating-backdown-labor-on-pm-s-west-jerusalem-decision>.

<sup>51</sup> Fergus Hunter and David Wroe, “Embassy move: a ‘slap to Indonesia’s face””, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 Oct 2018.

revealed that bilateral relations with Indonesia were overwhelmingly featured in articles (See Figure 2). However, this is not indicative of attempts to influence public opinion towards the announcement as part of agenda setting, rather this is likely part of the media's 'fourth estate' role to inform public on matters that are of interest. When considering the constraints on space and word limit, this likely explains the smaller references to other elements.

Figure 1: Article reactions to Scott Morrison's announcement




Further evidence on non-influence can be derived from an analysis of the statements by Scott Morrison. The initial announcement by Scott Morrison was that Australia would *consider* moving its embassy and that it would *consider* recognising Jerusalem. In December, Scott Morrison announced that he had consulted cabinet, departmental heads and other relevant stakeholders as promised and they had come to a resolution. It seems more likely that these consultations were far more influential in devising Australia's foreign policy than media coverage of the issue. Therefore it is concluded that the media had little to no influence over October or December announcements.

This finding is consistent with previous studies of the influence of media on Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. A 2013 study by Han and Rane which surveyed 9237 articles in the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian written between the 1 January 2000 and 31 December

2010.<sup>52</sup> The study sought to analyse the content of articles to examine the extent to which the historical context is covered, international law is discussed in connection to the resolution of the conflict and also how final status issues are covered. It was justified that these points represent a sound understanding of the conflict. From this analysis, the researchers sought to draw conclusions about the impact of media upon the general public and by extension foreign policy.

Figure 2: Focus of coverage by sample articles



The study found that neither the Australian or Sydney Morning Herald displayed open support for either side of the conflict. Han and Rane found that there was fair and equal coverage of the motives of both sides, however connotative language, such as “militant”, was frequently used when describing the Palestinian side.<sup>53</sup> The main finding of the study was that the Australian media fails to cover the issue with any meaningful depth to properly inform the Australian public, which is surprising given that an average of 2.3 articles was produced per day on the topic.<sup>54</sup> As outlined in Table 1, rarely did articles in the sample mention important topics which are central to understanding the conflict. Han and Rane instead found a majority of articles focussed on violence and events. It was asserted that this reinforces the intractability of the conflict, leaving

<sup>52</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, p. 79.

<sup>53</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, p. 80-81.

<sup>54</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, p. 94-96.

the public with little hope for resolution and thus disengaging the public. As a result, there is no public engagement or challenge to existing government foreign policy, and Han and Rane conclude that media has little to no influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine.

Thus, there is no obvious or measurable relationship between media coverage and influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. It should be re-emphasised that the media do have a large potential to influence public opinion and foreign policy, however, it is not realised on this particular topic. Further analysis and study should be conducted into the way the media portray Islam and the Middle East in general. A non-academic report by an Islamic media outlet based in Sydney claims that in 2017, Murdoch owned newspapers wrote 2,891 negative articles about Islam.<sup>55</sup> There is the potential that these negative articles make Palestine ‘guilty by association’ in the minds of everyday Australians and could negatively influence foreign policy. This is similar to the way that Malcolm Fraser easily equated Palestine with terrorists and Israel with democracy in the relevant history section.

Table One: Han & Rane Content Analysis Results	
Topic/Issue	Percentage of articles in Han & Ran sample which reference the topic. <sup>56</sup>
Historical Origins of Conflict	14%
International Law and UN Resolutions	5%
Refugees	13%
Israeli Settlements	23%
Final status of Jerusalem	10%


<sup>55</sup> One Path Network, *2017 A Year in Review: Islam in the Media*, accessed 06/05/2019 via [https://onpathnetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/OnePath\\_Islam\\_In\\_The\\_Media\\_Report.pdf](https://onpathnetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/OnePath_Islam_In_The_Media_Report.pdf).

<sup>56</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, pp. 73-96.

## Public Opinion

As a democracy, it is logical that Australian public opinion should have influence over government policy. Within political science, there are two enduring models which attempt to explain the power that public opinion holds over the government and by extension policy. In the Rational-Activist model, citizens are assumed to be “politically informed, involved, rational and above all, active”.<sup>57</sup> The citizen is then expected to vote for a candidate who best reflects their preferences. Should the elected candidate neglect the wishes of the public, they are voted out at the next election. Thus in the Rational-Activist model, power rests with the public and the elected candidate is compelled by that power. In the Political Parties model, the same assumption is made about the individual being politically informed, except the individual engages with the political party as an intermediate institution.<sup>58</sup> The party then enacts its platform via its elected candidates who are judged by the public through their tenure. Once again, if dissatisfied with their performance, the public will vote against the party. Therefore, in theory, at least, public opinion does influence government policy. This should be evident through the alignment of public opinion with government policy.

Figure 3. Political Science Models of Public Opinion



<sup>57</sup> Norman Luttbeg, *Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage*, (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 4.

<sup>58</sup> Norman Luttbeg, *Public Opinion and Public Policy* p. 5.

However, it appears that in Australia public opinion and foreign policy over Palestine currently do not align. A study of various polls conducted over the years reveals that Australian foreign policy, as determined by government statements and actions, is increasingly the antithesis of public opinion. These results are summarised in Table 2 below. Given the wide disparity between positions, it is concluded that **public opinion has little to no influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine**. Interestingly, public opinion has previously been found to influence foreign policy, such as the Vietnam War.<sup>59</sup>

Table 2: Comparing Australian Public Opinion and Australian Government Positions.	
Australian Public Opinion	Australian Government Position
<p><u>Israeli Settlements</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 77.7% of Australians agree that Israel should withdraw from settlements in the Occupied Territories.<sup>60</sup></li> <li>- 61% of Australians oppose the building of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land.<sup>61</sup></li> <li>- 53% of Australians oppose the government's refusal to accept UN resolution 2334 on the illegality of Israeli settlements.<sup>62</sup></li> </ul>	<p><u>Israeli Settlements</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Under the Rudd and Gillard governments, Australia consistently voted in favour of UNGA resolutions which stated Israeli settlements are illegal.<sup>63</sup></li> <li>- Since the Coalition was re-elected, the Australian government has abstained on UNGA resolutions.<sup>64</sup> Under Morrison, Australia has often voted against resolutions.</li> <li>- Julie Bishop and Malcolm Turnbull indicated that they would have voted against UNSC resolution 2334 which was sponsored by the Obama administration and condemned Israeli</li> </ul>

<sup>59</sup> Eugene Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).

<sup>60</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, p. 117.

<sup>61</sup> "Roy Morgan Opinion Polls on Palestine", Australia Palestine Advocacy Network, published 24 Mar. 2017, accessed 08/05/2019 via [https://apan.org.au/apan-activities/opinion\\_poll/](https://apan.org.au/apan-activities/opinion_poll/).

<sup>62</sup> "Roy Morgan Opinion Polls on Palestine"

<sup>63</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict: Rudd and Gillard Governments*, p. 7.

<sup>64</sup> Renee Westra, "The Coalition, Labor and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 2013", Australian Parliamentary Library, published 22 Feb. 2017, accessed 08/05/2019 via [https://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Departments/Parliamentary\\_Library/FlagPost/2017/February/The\\_Coalition\\_Labor\\_and\\_the\\_Israeli\\_Palestinian\\_conflict\\_since\\_2013](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2017/February/The_Coalition_Labor_and_the_Israeli_Palestinian_conflict_since_2013).

	settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. <sup>65</sup>
<u>Feelings towards Israelis and Palestinians</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lowy institute’s “Feelings towards other nations,” asks Australians about their feelings towards states, with 100 being very warm and favourable to zero being very cold and unfavourable.<sup>66</sup> As seen in Figure 4, Australians are consistently very mild in their feelings towards Israel.</li> <li>- 34% of Australians sympathise with Palestinians, compared to 26% who sympathise with Israelis.<sup>67</sup></li> </ul>	<u>Feelings towards Israelis and Palestinians</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Kevin Rudd allegedly described Israel as being “in my DNA”.<sup>68</sup></li> <li>- Malcolm Turnbull described the friendship as “old as the state of Israel itself”.<sup>69</sup></li> <li>- Scott Morrison claimed that there is “deep friendship between our nations” when commemorating 70 years of diplomatic relations with Israel.<sup>70</sup></li> </ul>
<u>Recognition of Palestine</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 73% of Australians want to recognise Palestine as a state.<sup>71</sup></li> <li>- 51% of Australians believed that Australia should have voted in favour of recognising Palestine as a state at the UN in 2012. 15% voted no, 20% voted to abstain, 14% voted for ‘don’t know’.<sup>72</sup></li> </ul>	<u>Recognition of Palestine</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gillard wanted Australia to vote against the UNGA Palestinian statehood resolution, the government eventually abstained.<sup>73</sup></li> <li>- The Coalition has rebuffed calls to recognise Palestine, maintaining that statehood must be the result of negotiations.<sup>74</sup></li> </ul>
<u>Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 55% of Australians consider the BDS</li> </ul>	<u>Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Following the Max Brenner incident,</li> </ul>

<sup>65</sup> Andrew Greene, “Australia distances itself from Obama administration's stance against Israeli settlements” ABC, published 30 Dec. 2016, accessed 08/05/2019 via <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-30/australia-rejects-obama-stance-against-israeli-settlements/8153504>.

<sup>66</sup> “Lowy Institute Poll 2018: Feelings towards other nations” Lowy Institute, accessed 08/05/2019 via <https://lowyinstitutepoll.lowyinstitute.org/feelings-towards-other-nations/>.

<sup>67</sup> “Roy Morgan Opinion Polls on Palestine”

<sup>68</sup> “Rudd returning as head of Australian ruling party”, *Times of Israel*, published 23 Jun. 2013, accessed 08/05/19 via <https://www.timesofisrael.com/rudd-returning-as-head-of-australian-ruling-party/>.

<sup>69</sup> Malcolm Turnbull, “Israeli PM’s visit cements a warm, old friendship” *The Australian*, published 22 Feb. 2017.

<sup>70</sup> Scott Morrison, “Statement to the House of Representatives on the 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations with Israel”.

<sup>71</sup> “Roy Morgan Opinion Polls on Palestine”

<sup>72</sup> Roy Morgan Research November 2011 found in Peter Manning, “Political stance on Palestine is out of step with public opinion” *Sydney Morning Herald*, published 13 Feb. 2012, accessed 08/05/19 via <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/political-stance-on-palestine-is-out-of-step-with-public-opinion-2012-1szkn.html>.

<sup>73</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict: Rudd and Gillard Governments*, p. 9.

<sup>74</sup> Malcolm Turnbull, “Israeli PM’s visit cements a warm, old friendship”.



<p>movement reasonable.</p>	<p>both Rudd and Gillard denounced the movement.<sup>75</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Coalition criticised Rudd and Gillard for not being stronger in their denouncing of the BDS movement.<sup>76</sup></li> <li>- Malcolm Turnbull has previously condemned the movement.<sup>77</sup></li> </ul>
<p><u>Nature of the Conflict</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 54.8% of Australians believed the nature of the conflict is “Palestinians trying to end Israel’s occupation and form their own state”.</li> <li>- 31.7% of Australians believe the nature of the conflict is Israelis fighting for security against Palestinian terrorism”.</li> <li>- 4.1% believed it was both self determination and self-defence.<sup>78</sup></li> </ul>	<p><u>Nature of the Conflict</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- As mentioned earlier, the Australian government tends to emphasise Israel’s right to security, often depicting it as the victim.</li> <li>- Scott Morrison labelled descriptions of Israel as a “centre of international cruelty” as “intellectual fraud”.<sup>79</sup></li> <li>- Turnbull wrote in the Australian, Israel has “flourished despite invasion, conflict”, once again implying victimhood.<sup>80</sup></li> </ul>
<p><u>Reaction to Gaza War 2008-09</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 42% of Australians believed Israel’s actions in Gaza were not justified.</li> <li>- 28% of Australians believed it was justified.</li> <li>- 29% of respondents voted for “can’t say”<sup>81</sup></li> </ul>	<p><u>Reaction to Gaza War 2008-09</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In a statement Gillard condemned Hamas in the “the strongest possible terms” but only urged Israel to be mindful.<sup>82</sup></li> </ul>
<p><u>Australian Government Policy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 80% of Australians support Australian</li> </ul>	<p><u>Australian Government Policy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Australian government routinely</li> </ul>

<sup>75</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict: Rudd and Gillard Governments*, p. 14.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Malcolm Turnbull, “Joint Press Conference with the Prime Minister of the State of Israel - Sydney” Malcolm Turnbull, published 22 Feb. 2017, accessed 08/05/2019 via <https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/joint-press-conference-with-the-prime-minister-of-the-state-of-israel-sydne>.

<sup>78</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, p. 112.

<sup>79</sup> Scott Morrison, “Statement to the House of Representatives on the 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations with Israel”

<sup>80</sup> Malcolm Turnbull, “Israeli PM’s visit cements a warm, old friendship”.

<sup>81</sup> Roy Morgan Research May 2009 found in Peter Manning, “Political stance on Palestine is out of step with public opinion” *Sydney Morning Herald*, published 13 Feb. 2012, accessed 08/05/19 via <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/political-stance-on-palestine-is-out-of-step-with-public-opinion-2012-1szkn.html>.

<sup>82</sup> Marty Harris, *Australia and the Middle East Conflict: Rudd and Gillard Governments*, p. 11.


<p>foreign policy being based on international law and human rights.<sup>83</sup></p>	<p>boycotts discussion of Agenda Item 7 at the Human Rights Council which is concerned with the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Since the Coalition’s re-election, Australia has routinely abstained on UNGA resolutions reaffirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War) to Palestine.<sup>84</sup></li> </ul>
<p><u>Recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 76% of Australians were opposed to Donald Trump’s declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.<sup>85</sup></li> </ul>	<p><u>Recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Australia now recognises West Jerusalem and will move its embassy once negotiations are concluded.</li> </ul>

It is hypothesised that while public opinion is in favour of Palestine, the issue does not feature high enough in the priorities of voters to force a change in the Liberal Party. In the 2019 election, the Australian public was more concerned with policies related to the environment, economy, healthcare and education than foreign policy relating to Israel and Palestine.<sup>86</sup> Thus the Coalition policy continues unchallenged by the public. While the Labor party’s policy is to recognise a Palestinian state, it is likely that public opinion has factored in as a consideration to a slight degree. This is based upon a side comment in Bob Carr’s memoir where ahead of the UN vote on Palestinian status, Labor MP’s mention concerns about their large Arab populations and what a ‘pro-Israel’ vote would signify to them.<sup>87</sup> However, as discussed in the following section, it appears that the influence of interest and lobby groups is quite significant. Furthermore, the

<sup>83</sup> Eulalia Han and Halim Rane, *Making Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine*, p. 116.  
<sup>84</sup> Renee Westra, “The Coalition, Labor and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 2013”.  
<sup>85</sup> “Australians oppose Trump’s decision to declare Jerusalem Israeli capital”, Roy Morgan Research, published 16 Dec 2016, accessed 08/05/2019 via <http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/7446-jerusalem-capital-of-israel-or-not-australia-december-2017-201712150829>.  
<sup>86</sup> Catherine Hanrahan, “Vote Compass finds voters are split on environment and economy as most important issue” ABC, published 17 Apr. 2019, accessed 12/05/2019 via <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-17/vote-compass-election-most-important-issues/11003192>.  
<sup>87</sup> Bob Carr, *Diary of a Foreign Minister*, (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2014), p. 235-239.

recent unreliability of polls in predicting Brexit<sup>88</sup>, the election of Donald Trump<sup>89</sup> and the re-election of the Coalition government<sup>90</sup> make it easier for politicians to dismiss the reliability of such polls representing the electorate. As such, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy is deemed negligible.

Figure 4: Data from Lowy Institute "Feelings Thermometer" of select states



<sup>88</sup> Pamela Duncan, "How the pollsters got it wrong on the EU referendum", *The Guardian*, published 24 Jun. 2016, accessed 19/05/2019 via <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/how-eu-referendum-pollsters-wrong-opinion-predict-close>.

<sup>89</sup> Nate Cohn, "A 2016 Review: Why Key State Polls Were Wrong About Trump", *The New York Times*, published 31 May 2017, accessed 19/05/2019 via <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/upshot/a-2016-review-why-key-state-polls-were-wrong-about-trump.html>.

<sup>90</sup> Paige Cockburn and Bellinda Kontominas, "Election 2019: How the polls got it so wrong in predicting a Labor victory", *ABC*, published 19 May 2019, accessed 19/05/2019 via <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-19/federal-election-results-how-the-polls-got-it-so-wrong/11128176>.

## Interest and Lobby Groups

This section finds that **lobby and interest groups almost certainly influence Australia's foreign policy towards Palestine**. However, the quality of available evidence only allows this to be inferred as opposed to proven outright by explicit evidence. Yet the quantity of available evidence ensures that what is inferred can be done with a high degree of confidence.

Using the models outlined above (see Figure 3), an alignment of government policy with the position outlined by an interest or lobby group suggests that the interest or lobby group is influential over government policy. As discussed in the introduction, the policy of the Liberal party currently aligns with interest and lobby groups such as AIJAC, ZFA and ECAJ. While on the other hand, the policy of the Labor party more or less aligns with groups such as APAN and AFOPA. Thus, it would appear as though interest and lobby groups do influence Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. However, alignment of positions alone is not in evidential of direct influence. This model does not account for coincidence or the potentially more influential role of an unknown factor. Thus, it strongly infers that interest and lobby groups are influential over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine, however, this alone is not outright proof.

Examining the activities of interest and lobby groups in Australia further bolsters the inference that there is influence over Australia's foreign policy. For example, AIJAC is well funded by private donations and extremely well connected. This has resulted in AIJAC fully funding 44 trips to Israel for Federal Parliamentarians between 2010 and 2018.<sup>91</sup> State Parliamentarians are also sponsored by AIJAC to visit Israel,<sup>92</sup> with Daniel Andrews, premier of Victoria having promised Dr Colin Rubenstein, the executive director of AIJAC, as opposition leader that he would travel to Israel.<sup>93</sup> In October last year, coincidentally five days before Scott Morrison made his Jerusalem announcement, Mark Leibler, the National Chairman of AIJAC, Dr Colin Rubenstein and Solomon Lew, a billionaire and long-term supporter of AIJAC, met with the Prime Minister for over an hour.

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<sup>91</sup> Jessica Clarence, *Who funds Federal Parliamentarians' overseas travel?*, (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018), p. 4.

<sup>92</sup> Parliament of Western Australia, *Report of Interstate And Overseas Travel Undertaken By Members of Parliament Funded by the Imprest System*, (Perth: State Government of Western Australia, 2010), p. 55-65.

<sup>93</sup> Adam Slonim and Ben Maxfield, "Interview with The Hon Daniel Andrews MP" Australia-Israel Labour Dialogue, published 6 Mar. 2014, accessed 13/05/2019 via <http://aild.org.au/interview-with-the-hon-daniel-andrews-mp/>.

<sup>94</sup> AIJAC is also well organised, producing regular commentary and analysis on issues relating to Israel and Palestine. AIJAC also produces a monthly review which is freely distributed to parliamentarians, and regularly makes submissions to Parliament.<sup>95</sup> AIJAC also closely monitors media and if it feels as though articles have been ‘unbalanced’, will release statements.<sup>96</sup> Thus AIJAC is well funded, well connected, incredibly organised and extremely professional.<sup>97</sup> As such, it is a logical extrapolation from such evidence that AIJAC is influential over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. However, it is a big assumption that parliamentarian engagement with AIJAC results in complete and wholly unreserved support. A prime example is former foreign minister Bob Carr, who had been the president and founder of Labour friends of Israel, yet consistently expressed concern over Israeli settlements and called them illegal.<sup>98</sup> Thus, association does not mean leverage and so it can only be inferred that interest and lobby groups are influential over Australian foreign policy.

The Palestinian groups in Australia are not as well funded, connected, organised or professional as their Israeli counterparts, however, it can be inferred that there is some influence over Australian foreign policy. For example, between 2010 and 2018, APAN paid for the accommodation of 9 Federal Parliamentarians to visit Palestine.<sup>99</sup> Yet, APAN also appears to have a solid group of sympathisers, with an established ‘Parliamentary Friends of Palestine’ group as well as semi-regular statements made in the House of Representatives and Senate in support of Palestinian causes.<sup>100</sup> APAN’s organisation and professionalism appears to be low, as the

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<sup>94</sup> “AIJAC leaders meet with Prime Minister Scott Morrison” Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council, published 11 Oct 2019, accessed 13/05/2019 via <https://aijac.org.au/media-release/aijac-leaders-meet-with-prime-minister-scott-morrison/>.

<sup>95</sup> For example see “Submission to Senate Inquiry into Allegations of Political Interference in the ABC”, Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council, published 26 Nov. 2018, accessed 13/05/2018 via <https://aijac.org.au/resource/aijac-inquiry-abc-bias-israel/>. Also “AIJAC’s submission to the Australian Government’s Soft Power Review”, Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council, published 19 Dec. 2018, accessed 13/05/2019 via <https://aijac.org.au/resource/aijacs-submission-to-the-australian-governments-soft-power-review/>.

<sup>96</sup> “About AIJAC”, Australia/Israel Jewish Affairs Council, accessed 13/05/2019 via <https://aijac.org.au/about-aijac/>.

<sup>97</sup> Antony Loewenstein, *My Israel Question*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2006), pp. 160-183.

<sup>98</sup> Bob Carr, “West Bank settlements always illegal”, *The Australian*, published 11 Feb. 2014.

<sup>99</sup> Jessica Clarence, *Who funds Federal Parliamentarians Overseas Travel?*, p. 4.

<sup>100</sup> “Palestine in Australian Politics 2018”, Australia-Palestine Advocacy Network, published 7 Mar. 2018, accessed 14/05/2019 via <https://apan.org.au/2018/03/07/palestine-in-australian-politics-2018/>. See also “Palestine in Australian Politics 2017”, Australia-Palestine Advocacy Network, published 1 Jan. 2018, accessed 14/05/2019 via <https://apan.org.au/2018/01/01/palestine-in-australian-politics-2017/>.

‘Highlights’ section of the website has not been updated since February 2018.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, preceding the election, APAN only released one media statement in 2019, which is incorrectly dated as 2018.<sup>102</sup> However, APAN has also made submissions to Parliament and government departments.<sup>103</sup> Therefore, APAN’s is not nearly as well funded, connected, organised or professional as their Israeli counterparts. However, it can still be inferred that APAN holds some degree of influence. This is inferred from the thanking of Wendy Turner<sup>104</sup>, a Queensland unionist and APAN executive member, in Tony Burke’s speech at the national conference calling Labor to recognise Palestine.<sup>105</sup>

Inferences about the influence of interest and lobby groups over Australian foreign policy are somewhat supported by accounts in the biographies of former government officials. Former foreign minister Bob Carr argues that the Israeli lobby groups wielded significant influence over Julia Gillard. Carr details an incident where after releasing a routine statement condemning Israeli settlements, he was approached by an advisor to Ms Gillard on Jewish affairs, Bruce Wolpe, requesting a telephone call with the Israeli lobby groups.<sup>106</sup> Carr further details in his book *Diary of a Foreign Minister*, his clashes with Ms Gillard over Australia’s voting at the UN as he tried to secure Arab and African votes for a spot on the UNSC. Carr argues that Gillard’s resistance to abstaining on the UN resolution concerning the Israeli-Lebanese oil dispute as well as the resolution upgrading the status of Palestine at the UN is fuelled by the influence of the Melbourne based Jewish lobby.<sup>107</sup> However, Gillard asserts in her book *My Story*, that Carr wrongly assumed that Wolpe was at the foundation of Gillard’s pro-Israeli positions. Instead, Gillard contends “I was no one’s captive. I simply did not agree with him”.<sup>108</sup> Gillard had decided that “if the only way to become a member of the Security Council was to sell out our nation’s

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<sup>101</sup> “APAN Highlights”, Australia-Palestine Advocacy Network, accessed 14/05/2019 via <https://apan.org.au/apan-activities/>.

<sup>102</sup> “APAN media releases”, Australia Palestine Advocacy Network, accessed 14/05/2019 via <https://apan.org.au/media-releases/>.

<sup>103</sup> Australia Palestine Advocacy Network, *Australia Foreign Policy White Paper Submission by Australia Palestine Advocacy Network*, (Canberra: APAN, 2017).


<sup>104</sup> “APAN People” Australia Palestine Advocacy Network, accessed 14/05/2019 via <https://apan.org.au/about/apan-people/>.

<sup>105</sup> Tony Burke, Speech: ALP National Conference - Conference Calls On Labor To Recognise The State Of Palestine”, published 18 Dec. 2018, accessed 14/05/2019 via <https://www.tonyburke.com.au/speechestranscripts/2018/12/18/speech-alp-national-conference-labor-to-recognise-the-state-of-palestine>.

<sup>106</sup> Bob Carr, *Run for your life*, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2018), p. 183.

<sup>107</sup> Bob Carr, *Run for your life*, pp.189-247.

<sup>108</sup> Julia Gillard, *My Story*, (Milsons Point: Random House, 2014), p. 211.



support for Israel, then we should accept defeat rather than compromise”.<sup>109</sup> As such, inferences can be made about the influence of lobby and interest groups, yet very little can be solidly concluded.

As such, this section finds that lobby and interest groups almost certainly influence Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. This finding is consistent with similar studies conducted in the US by academics such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, who argue that the US’ diplomatic and material support of Israel is not explained by strategic or moral arguments and therefore is most likely the work of a strong lobby.<sup>110</sup> However, the US study is surrounded by great controversy and also very fair critiques which centre upon its assumptions and use of evidence.<sup>111</sup> Similarly, it is impossible to prove outright influence over foreign policy based on the lack of explicit evidence. Yet the positions adopted by the major political parties, the activities of the interest and lobby groups as well as biographies of former politicians, ensure it can be strongly inferred that there is some influence.



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<sup>109</sup> Julia Gillard, *My Story*, p. 208.

<sup>110</sup> John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux: New York, 2007).

<sup>111</sup> Abraham Foxman, *The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the myth of Jewish control*, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007).

## Influences in the International Context

Following Gyngell and Wesley's framework, this chapter examines the international context and its influences on Australian foreign towards Palestine. Specifically, this chapter focuses on Australia's alliance with the US, strong relationship with Israel and the likely impact of emerging global trends.

### Relationship with the US and Israel

In this section, it is found that Australia's relationship with the US and Israel are likely to be strong influences. The available evidence does not explicitly prove influence over foreign policy, however, it can once again be strongly inferred.

Israeli influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine can be strongly inferred from analysis of US diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks. Cables reveal that former Israeli Ambassador Yuval Rotem appeared to have an unusual level of access to both Rudd and Gillard. For example, in 2008 Rotem bragged to the US Economic Counselor, Edgard Kagan, that when he called DFAT about a routine matter, usually handled at the working level, the call would often be returned by the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor.<sup>112</sup> In another cable, Rotem mentions how he had been working very closely with Acting PM Gillard and National Security Advisor Duncan Lewis following the fighting in Gaza.<sup>113</sup> Rotem was extremely pleased with the Australian response to the conflict, which it is worth noting, as per the section on public opinion, appeared to be at odds with the feelings of the public.

This unusual level of access and by extension potential influence is corroborated in Bob Carr's *Diary of a Foreign Minister*. Carr reveals that he visited Rotem before a UN vote condemning Israel's treatment of Arabs in the occupied territory. In Carr's words "I saw Yuval Rotem, the Israeli Ambassador, and asked him to cut us some slack, to watch us vote for the motion without a fuss".

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<sup>112</sup> Edgard Kagan, "Israeli Ambassador: Rudd firm on Iran 08CANBERRA747\_a", Wikileaks, created 8 Jul. 2008, accessed 16/05/2019 via [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08CANBERRA747\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08CANBERRA747_a.html).

<sup>113</sup> Edgard Kagan, "Gaza: Australian response makes Israeli Ambassador happy 09CANBERRA34\_a", created 9 Jan. 2009, accessed 16/05/2019 via [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09CANBERRA34\\_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09CANBERRA34_a.html).



<sup>114</sup> Carr asked to be cut slack so that Australia would not be one of a few nations voting alongside Israel and the US, jeopardising the potential bid for a seat at the UNSC. While this could be a diplomatic courtesy between nations with a strong partnership, it also appears peculiar to ask permission to enact Australian foreign policy. Ahead of a different vote at the UN, Gillard in texts with Carr confirms that she has done a “quiet check-out re the Israelis”,<sup>115</sup> once again suggesting a privileged position to input and influence Australian foreign policy.

Australia’s alliance with the US is also highly likely to be an influence over Australia’s foreign policy towards Palestine. As discussed in the relevant history section, Australia has always bound itself in defence and foreign policy to a ‘great and powerful friend’. While not outright proof, Australia’s alignment of policy with the US, does suggest influence. This is best demonstrated by Australia’s willingness to be one of the very few states who vote alongside the US on UN resolutions it deems to be ‘anti-semitic’.<sup>116</sup> Wikileaks cables reveal that Washington takes great interest in Australia’s position towards Israel, yet cables do not show an exertion of pressure on Canberra to adopt particular positions.<sup>117</sup> As such, it is more likely that Washington’s actions provide precedents that Australian governments obligingly follow. For example, it seems highly unlikely that Australia would have considered moving its embassy to Jerusalem had the US not already done so. However, Australia has on occasion diverged from the US position, as demonstrated by Australia distancing itself from the US’ abstention over UN resolution 2334 which criticised Israel’s occupation and settlements.<sup>118</sup> Therefore, it is highly likely that the US is an influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine, yet hard to prove outright.

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<sup>114</sup> Bob Carr, *Diary of a Foreign Minister*, p. 95.

<sup>115</sup> Bob Carr, *Diary of a Foreign Minister*, p. 189.

<sup>116</sup> David Wroe, “Australia defends voting against 'unbalanced' United Nations investigation into Gaza killings”, *Sydney Morning Herald*, published 19 May 2018 accessed 16/05/19 via <https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/australia-votes-against-but-un-sets-up-probe-into-gaza-killings-20180519-p4zqau.html>. See also “120 countries at UN condemn Israel over Gaza violence” SBS, published 14 Jun. 2018, accessed 16/05/19 via <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/120-countries-at-un-condemn-israel-over-gaza-violence>.

<sup>117</sup> “Read All the Australian Wikileaks Cables”, *The Australian*, published 15 Dec. 2010, accessed 16/05/19 via <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/australian-wikileaks-cables/news-story/fbf4eb6f5d703c64581cb733521fab7a>.

<sup>118</sup> Andrew Greene, “Australia distances itself from Obama administration's stance against Israeli settlements” ABC, published 30 Dec. 2016, accessed 08/05/2019 via <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-12-30/australia-rejects-obama-stance-against-israeli-settlements/8153504>.

## Emerging Global Trends

Australia's strategic environment is undergoing significant changes which will impact the outlook of Australia, and subsequently the way it conducts its international relations. Highlighting a few key trends, this section argues that these trends will influence Australia to adopt a more neutral foreign policy towards Palestine.

### Diffusion of Power

When Richard Nixon met Mao Zedong in Beijing a deal was struck that America would recognise the communist government and China would not contest America's strategic leadership in Asia. When Japan reconciled this deal, a strategic order of states was established, which provided the foundations for stable relations and significant economic growth in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>119</sup> The success of this post-Vietnam strategic order is now leading to its own revision, with the growth of China, India and Indonesia increasing their national wealth and also power in international relations. Modelling completed by PricewaterhouseCoopers, see Appendix 1, predicts that Asia will house four of the top five economies by 2030.<sup>120</sup> As such power is being spread across the Indo-Pacific, slowly eroding the monopoly Washington once held.

Naturally, such findings have given rise to a large amount of academic debate. In Australia, this debate has centred around what role America and China will play, and whether we need to choose between our strategic ally, the US or our economic partner, China. For academics such as Hugh White the answer is clear, arguing that the US will withdraw from Asia, most likely peacefully and willingly.<sup>121</sup> Understandably diplomatic, Australian government policy has shirked taking a position, with previous PM Malcolm Turnbull dismissing the idea as "fashionable".<sup>122</sup> However, the Australian government is certainly aware of the enormous power China is set to

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<sup>119</sup> Hugh White, "Power Shift: Rethinking Australia's place in the Asian Century", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol 65, No 1, 2011, p 82.


<sup>120</sup> PriceWaterHouseCoopers, *The Long View: How will the global economic order change by 2050?*, Feb 2017, p7.

<sup>121</sup> Hugh White, "Without America: Australia in the New Asia", p2.

<sup>122</sup> David Crowe, "Malcolm Turnbull rejects that Australia must choose between China or America", *The Australian*, 7 Sep 2016.

become, with the Foreign Affairs white paper<sup>123</sup> including a graphic, see Figure 5, outlining the predictions of China's economic growth.

**Figure 5: Infographic from the Australian Government 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper**




### Australia in the Asian Century

While America will no longer hold the same level of power, it will not become an insignificant player in international relations. As such, Australia must prepare itself for an Indo-Pacific with a diffused power order. Australia's heavy reliance upon Washington is likely to no longer become feasible or desirable. This has been reinforced by Trump's 'America First' isolationist approach. As such, academic literature has sought to predict the future direction of Australian foreign policy at large. It is argued that within these predictions, there are conditions which will influence Australian foreign policy in the international context to become slightly more 'pro-Palestinian' or truly neutral.

One academic hypothesis is that Australia will seek to find a new 'great and powerful friend'. The state frequently put forth is Indonesia, as our proximity results in shared interests.<sup>124</sup> Any attack

<sup>123</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), p. 26.

<sup>124</sup> Hugh White, "The Jakarta Switch: Why Australia needs to pin its hopes (not fears) on a great and powerful Indonesia" *Australian Foreign Affairs*, issue 3, 2018 pp. 7-30.



from the north or foreign interference in the neighbourhood is against the interests of both states. Indonesia is also on a promising power trajectory, with strong economic growth and a large population. PriceWaterhouseCoopers predicts Indonesia as being the fifth largest global economy by 2030.<sup>125</sup> Indonesia is also a staunch supporter of Palestine and has previously called upon Australia to recognise a Palestinian state.<sup>126</sup> As such, any improved partnerships between Jakarta and Canberra have the high potential to curtail Australia's 'pro-Israel' positions. An example of this is Indonesia stalling the signing of a free trade agreement following Scott Morrison's Wentworth announcement. However, Australia's relations with Indonesia have historically been fraught with simmering tension and there is a mixed likelihood of this option materialising.

Another prediction is that Australia could look horizontally, rather than vertically, and find security in the form of a middle power security cooperation.<sup>127</sup> During the cold war, Australia worked closely with Singapore, Malaysia and other Asian states to fend off communism. In 2007 Australia was part of the 'Quad' a defence group consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US. It is difficult to predict with certainty the shape a regional security organisation could take or even the exact states Australia would side with. However it will almost certainly reduce the reliance of Australia upon Washington, and certainly, increase its reliance upon capitals which recognise Palestine.



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<sup>125</sup> Refer to Appendix 2

<sup>126</sup> "'Recognise State of Palestine': Indonesia on PM's west Jerusalem decision" *SBS*, published 16 Dec. 2018, accessed 20/05/19 via <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/recognise-state-of-palestine-indonesia-on-pm-s-west-jerusalem-decision>.

<sup>127</sup> Andrew Carr and Christopher Roberts, "Security with Asia?" in *After American Primacy: Imagining the future of Australia's Defence*, Peter Dean, Stephan Fruhling and Brendan Taylor eds, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2019), pp. 161-175.

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## Conclusion

Guided by the theoretical framework outlined by Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, the aim of this study was to identify and analyse the influences on Australian foreign policy towards Palestine in both the domestic and international contexts. This led to diligent but brief evaluations on the role the media, public opinion, lobby groups and evaluations of Australia's relationship with Israel and the US and emerging global trends.

The study found that in the domestic context, Australian foreign policy towards Palestine seems to be hardly influenced by the media or public opinion. Although the media has a high potential and proven examples of influencing government policy, it does not materialise on this particular topic. This was found to be due to a relatively even balance of newspaper articles that adopt 'pro-Israeli' and 'pro-Palestinian' or neutral positions. As such government policy is not challenged. Similarly, it was found that public opinion has little influence over Australian foreign policy. Findings revealed that foreign policy is more often than not at odds with public opinion over Palestine. While academic theory proposes that leaders who do not enact the views of the public should lose the upcoming election, the foreign policy of Australia towards Palestine is a low priority for voters, thus not pressuring a change in a government position.

In the domestic context, it was found that interest and lobby groups appear to exercise the most influence. From an examination of the activities as well as drawing upon accounts from former political leaders, it can be strongly inferred that lobby groups exercise influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. In particular, AIJAC appears to be the most influential 'pro-Israeli' lobby group being well funded, well connected, incredibly organised and extremely professional. APAN, while not enjoying the same level of funding, connections or resources, is the most influential of the Palestinian lobby groups.

In the international context, it was found that Australia's relationship with the US and Israel are likely to be influential on Australian foreign policy towards Palestine. Wikileaks cables reveal that former Israeli Ambassador Yuval Rotem appeared to have an unusual level of access to the Prime Minister, even on routine matters. Furthermore, as Australia's main ally the US position is likely to set a precedent which Australian foreign policy follows. Therefore strongly suggesting influence.



However, current trends in international politics, namely the rise of states in the Indo-Pacific, appear to be eroding the future influence of the US and Israel over Australian foreign policy. As the power of the US declines gradually, and it turns more isolationist than internationalist, Australia will turn to the Indo-Pacific region for security. Many of the states Australia is likely to turn to are states which are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. If Australia is going to push for closer ties with states such as Indonesia, it is likely that Australia's 'pro-Israeli' stance will have to be curtailed.


As such this study has been a diligent but brief examination of the contextual level of Australia's foreign policy towards Palestine. While its findings are interesting and useful, a more comprehensive analysis should include the strategic, organisational and operational levels mentioned in Gyngell and Wesley's theoretical framework. These levels investigate the role of values and bureaucracy in foreign policy creation and when combined with the analysis in this report would provide a much more complete overview of the influences on Australian foreign policy.

Although Scott Morrison and the Coalition government has been re-elected, Australian foreign policy towards Palestine remains at somewhat of a crossroads. It must decide whether to turn right and throw unfettered support behind President Trump's 'deal of the century' peace plan or to quietly turn left and remain neutral. All the while, the Labor opposition will be waiting to take government and recognise a Palestinian state. Thus, Australian foreign policy towards Palestine has some complex crossroads to navigate, at least now it is better understood the extent certain factors will influence that navigation.

## Recommendations

### Engage in limited, outcome-oriented Public Diplomacy

A Coalition election victory means that Australian foreign policy will more or less be maintaining the status quo towards Palestine. Therefore Australia will not recognise or upgrade diplomatic relations with Palestine soon.



As such, it may be tempting for the Delegation to heavily invest in Public Diplomacy, in order to counteract the ‘pro-Israeli’ stance of the Coalition government with the hearts and minds of the public. This will appear particularly important with the election of Dave Sharma, who proposed the embassy move and is likely to become an important figure in Coalition foreign policy creation.

However, the findings of this paper suggest that the Delegation should be critical of the actual impact that public diplomacy can have. Given that public opinion and the media have little to no influence over Australian foreign policy towards Palestine, it does not seem clear that an investment of the Delegation’s limited human and financial resources will yield the desired results.

As such it is recommended that the Delegation engages in *limited and outcome-oriented Public Diplomacy*.

By limited, it is meant that the Delegation should restrict itself to public diplomacy activities which promote the interests and culture of Palestine. However, these activities should be limited to ensure they are consistent with Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations and do not appear activist.

By outcome-oriented, it is meant that the Delegation should engage in public diplomacy activities with a clear goal in mind and ensure that the chosen method is the most efficient and effective means to achieve that goal.

As such it is recommended that the Delegation continue to expand events such as the Palestinian Film Festival and partnership with ANU Film Group. These events have a large turnout, require a moderate level of coordination and achieve the desired results. On the other hand, it is recommended that the Delegation carefully evaluate the benefits of engaging other civil society groups or holding public events.

### Strengthen relations with Federal Parliamentarians

Based upon the finding that lobby groups appear to be the most influential factor in the domestic context and the majority of their work focuses on Federal Parliamentarians, it is recommended

that the Delegation increase its relations with members of the 46th Parliament. This is particularly important ahead of what is likely to be an extremely one-sided peace plan from Trump.

In particular, it is recommended that the Delegation encourage the formation of a Parliamentary Friends Group, or engage frequently with one. Previous Parliamentary Friends Groups<sup>128</sup> have included:

- Amnesty International Parliamentary Group
- Parliamentary Friends of Multiculturalism
- Parliamentary Friends of UNICEF
- Parliamentary Friends of the United Nations and United Nations Agencies
- Parliamentary Friends of the Arab League

These groups are ideal for the Delegation to engage with as they are non-partisan and allow for both Senators and MP's to engage on the topic. Furthermore, while the group cannot be sponsored by external organisations, individual events can be sponsored. Members of these groups would then form ideal candidates to be invited to events such as the UN Day for solidarity with the Palestinian people, the commemoration of Al-Nakba and also the Palestinian film festival. These members would also be ideal candidates for sponsored trips to Palestine.

This would ensure that when matters relating to Australian foreign policy to Palestine are discussed, the Delegation can be confident that a debate of higher quality and balance is being held.


### Continue to use solidarity of Ambassadors from the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Countries

Lastly, it is recommended that the Delegation continue to work with the diplomatic missions of states from the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Countries to use their collective voice to influence Australian foreign policy. This recommendation is based upon the emerging global trends which are causing shifts to Australia's strategic environment. In particular,

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<sup>128</sup> "Parliamentary Friendship Groups (non-country)", Australian Parliament House, accessed 21/05/19 via [https://www.aph.gov.au/About\\_Parliament/Parliamentary\\_Friendship.b](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Friendship.b).





Indonesia's opinion will be increasingly taken into account by Australian policy makers. Strong Indonesian support for the Palestinian cause could influence a shift in Australian foreign policy.

The collective voice of many states will be hard for the Australian government to ignore. Particularly when considering the cumulative value of trade with all of the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Countries. As such, it is recommended that the Delegation continue to seek support from these states, and encourage them to voice their opinion on matters.



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# Appendix 1: PwC Economic Modelling from “World in 2050 Report”.

